This study is an attempt to investigate the implications of changes in ownership structure and control transfer in the Japanese corporate market-a trend attributed mainly to the government's increasing liberalization policies during the 1990s. Our results show that firms characterized by more concentrated ownership are likely to prefer less debt as ownership concentration reduces the extent of agency costs between managers and shareholders and facilitates equity issues. The main bank system enables corporations to obtain funds easily through the debt market. Additionally, unwinding cross-shareholding between banks and corporations provides impetus for investment in relatively risky projects. The ownership pattern of private and foreign individuals is consistently associated with a shift from bank debt to equity financing. Moreover, managerial ownership reduces the risk of wasting free cash flows. Managers make fewer decisions that may have a negative effect on the firm's value because the part of costs that they will absorb as shareholders increases as their share of capital rises. The results suggest that government ownership is associated with more pressure on management and enforces the efficient use of cash flows. Changes in ultimate ownership will likely lead to major asset and capital restructuring in the coming years.
Introduction
Until the 1990s, indirect bank financing was the dominant practice among Japanese companies and had long shaped their financial structure. Their ownership structure was characterized by cross-shareholdings with banks and the corporate sector in which they operated. This type of shareholding pattern was not only associated with ownership structure, but it also had an impact on firms' financial choices for fund raising. This period resulted in close long-term business ties between firms and banks. According to a survey conducted by the Fuji Research Institute (1993), more than 90 percent of large listed corporations had one or two "main banks" (on average, 1.6) prior to the change in financial practices. 1 This cross-holding pattern, in turn, formed the basis of conventional Japanese corporate governance, where firms were heavily financed by bank borrowing and banks were represented on the firms' corporate boards. While such close bank-firm ties increased the availability of capital for borrowing firms, they did not necessarily lead to higher profitability or growth (Weinstein & Yafeh, 1998) . 2 Instead, they increased the cost of capital for firms. Banks involuntarily ended up extracting significant rents from their client firms through interest payments while inhibiting the latter's growth through conservative investment policies.
In the late 1980s, the age-old system hit a snag due to significant changes in the country's economic conditions (see Annex). In the first half of the 1990s, various regulations and restrictions introduced during the high-growth period were gradually relaxed or removed. During the decade, the process of dramatic deregulation and liberalization made corporate borrowing and raising equity in both domestic and foreign capital markets much easier. The liberalization of financial markets and easier access to capital markets reduced Japanese banks' market power. Access to foreign markets and more liberal domestic capital markets reduced the main banks' influence over firms' policies.
The availability of alternative sources of financing and the decline in the firm-main bank relationship led to a drastic change in firms' ownership structure. Increasingly, cross-held shares in companies that were once held for the purpose of maintaining a main bank's relationship with a firm were sold. Corporate governance structure and control, 1 A main bank relationship-the relationship between a firm and a bank-is typically characterized by the following: (i) the firm continuously accounts for a large (or the largest) volume of borrowing over a long period; (ii) the bank is a main shareholder in the firm; (iii) the bank carries out a variety of banking and other transactions with the firm, such as handling foreign exchange and undertaking the trustee function of corporate bonds; (iv) the bank maintains a close personal relationship by dispatching executives to the client firm; and (v) although the bank does not intervene in the management of the client firm, as long as the firm is making reasonable profits, the bank often rescues the client firm when the latter is in financial distress, provided that it is judged as being eventually viable. 2 Prowse (1990) suggests that, because large shareholders are also larger debt holders, they may preclude policies that attempt to transfer wealth from debt holders to shareholders. therefore, changed significantly during this period. The main bank system was gradually replaced by the increased role of market investors and the capital market in generating long-term capital.
In this study, our main focus is the impact of governance structure and change in ownership on firms' financial choices and borrowing patterns-a change apparently necessitated by the legal and corporate reforms that took place in the post-"bubble" period Japan. In this context, we aim to understand the following:  How companies determine their overall financial strategies  Why they choose a particular mix of financial instruments  Why they choose to limit borrowing or set up spare borrowing capacity  The association between corporate governance structure and changes in ultimate ownership Exploring these questions opens up the possibility of investigating:  The specific factors or characteristics that encourage firms to choose different financial strategies  Whether the structure of equity ownership can help explain crosssectional variations in capital structure in the case of Japanese firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes methodological issues pertaining to variable construction and modeling. Section 3 presents our empirical results. Section 4 assesses the robustness of the results and Section 5 presents some concluding remarks.
Methodological Issues: Variables, Modeling, and Sample
The way in which a firm finances its operations through some combination of common and preferred stock, either with retained earnings or with bonds and loans, is known as "capital structure." Generally, firms use either debt or equity to finance their investments. However, within the broad categories of debt and equity there exists a variety of financing instruments that firms can use. Firms also have different options for raising equity. Their choices can range from the owner's wealth to venture capital to private equity, although issuing common stock and warrants are the most common ways of raising equity. Regarding debt, the number of alternatives available to firms has increased significantly over the last two decades (Bauer, 2004) . The conventional choices were bank debt and corporate bonds, but in recent years there have been numerous innovations in this field, especially in the design of corporate bonds.
Although a firm can use any combination of sources, it should use one that maximizes its market value and, in turn, shareholders' wealth. 3 "Optimal capital structure" refers to that combination of sources of financing that maximizes the firm's market value. The literature on capital structure focuses mainly on whether or not corporate financing decisions matters at all. If financing decisions were completely irrelevant, then actual capital structures should vary randomly from firm to firm and industry to industry. However, this is not what the empirical evidence suggests.
This section examines various ways to measure capital structure and its empirical relevance. This is followed by a discussion on ownership structure and changes in ultimate control. Finally, the section presents other relevant independent variables, a model specification, and sample description.
Capital Structure
Two broad measures of capital structure are commonly used-one based on book value and the other on market value-and both have their strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, we compute two measures of capital structure in this study. The book value measure (BLEV) is defined as the ratio of the book value of total debt to the total book value of debt and equity, for instance, how the firm has been financed in the past and thus the relative claims of equity and debt over firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977) . Here, the relevant measure is probably the amount of total book value of debt to capital. MacKay and Philips (2005) point out that the use of book value can be justified on the grounds that financial managers tend to focus on this value when designing financial structures. Barclay and Clifford (1995) justify its use on the grounds that there may be a spurious relationship between the market value measure and Tobin's q ratio (TQR). Welch (2004) argues, however, that the market value measure of capital structure significantly explains stock returns. For this measure (denoted as MLEV), we follow Fama and French (2005) and Welch (2004) , and compute it as the ratio of book value of total debt to the book value of debt and the market value of common equity.
Corporate Ownership Structure
In terms of explanatory variables, the ultimate ownership structure of firms is classified into six distinct categories of shareholders.
Financial institutions, including banks and insurance companies, usually have business dealings such as lending, insurance sales, and other financial transactions, with firms in which they hold shares (Charkham, 1994) . Affiliated firms constitute another class of investor, commonly depicted as being a stable shareholder (Gerlach, 1992) . These companies are the business partners-either suppliers or customers-of other firms with which they have cross-shareholding arrangements. These affiliated companies hold multiple interests in these firms (Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian, 1996) . The impact of these investors is evaluated by the percentage of total outstanding shares held by financial institutions (BKSH) and affiliated companies (NBKSH).
Two classes of investors, i.e., foreign shareholders and domestic private individuals, are considered representative market investors as they are interested in maximizing their current profits rather than developing ongoing business ties with the firms in which they own shares (Inoue, 1999; Yasui, 1999) . The percentage of outstanding shares held by foreign investors (FRGN) and domestic private individuals (PRVT) are used to evaluate the importance of market investors.
The other two classes include the percentage shareholding of the government (GOVT) and that of internal investors such as directors and others (INSIDE).
Change in Ultimate Ownership
Identifying the ultimate owner of and change in control for each firm involves two steps. First, we identify the firm's ultimate owner using the criterion of percentage shareholding. A particular corporate entity as described above is considered the ultimate owner if it owns 50 percent or more of the firm's total outstanding shares. If the shareholding is split and none of the six categories (financial institutions, nonfinancial corporations, foreign individuals, domestic private individuals, the government, and insiders) holds more than 50 percent of the shares, then an ultimate owner does not exist and the ownership of the firm is considered to be diverse.
In the next step, we identify changes in ultimate share ownership by analyzing the percentage change in the shareholding over the sample period for each individual category. Changes in ultimate ownership are measured when the percentage shareholding of a particular group changes from less than 50 percent in the previous period to 50 percent or more in the next period. This is recorded as a change in ultimate ownership (denoted as UCT).
Regarding the various transfers of control, all ownership transfers are grouped into one of four categories: financial (FIT), nonfinancial (NFIT), private individual (PFIT), and diverse transfers. The definition of leverage, ownership structure, change in control, and various other control variables that are likely to affect the firm's capital structure decision are presented in Table 1 .
Control Variables
Given our objective in this study, we focus broadly on the relationship between the firm's leverage and ultimate ownership. However, it is necessary to take into account other control variables that might affect the firm's financial choices in order to avoid specification errors in the econometric model. Therefore, various firm-level financial ratios are included in the estimated model as control variables.
The size of a firm is included to account for the potential economies of scale and scope accruing to large firms. Size is an important determinant of capital structure as large firms are more likely to be debt-financed than their smaller counterparts. Large companies are more geospatially diversified and have more stable cash flows, which reduces the risk of the debt they hold. Additionally, they enjoy economies of scale when issuing securities to raise funds; smaller firms are likely to face higher costs when obtaining external funds because of information asymmetries.
We use the natural logarithm of total assets as the measure of firm size (SIZE) and expect it to have a positive impact on the leverage ratio. Profitability as a measure of the return on assets (ROA) has a negative relationship with leverage because firms usually prefer to finance their operations using internal funds rather than debt. Furthermore, the shares of profitable firms take on a high value in the stock market due to the higher dividends earned. Therefore, profitable firms may find it easy to raise funds by issuing equity. We therefore expect a negative relationship between ROA, as measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets, and the leverage ratio.
Firms that expect high future growth should use more retained earnings and equity rather than debt financing. An improvement in a firm's growth opportunities leads to an increase in the agency cost of debt, which further reduces the level of debt financing (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2001) . The firm's growth is measured by the TQR.
Greater volatility in the firm's earning stream leads to higher business risk, and lenders may be reluctant to provide loans. If the firm's earnings are volatile for seasonal or cyclical reasons or due to resource mismanagement, then they will have to pay an extra premium for debt financing. Moreover, such firms are likely to face difficulties in raising external funds because of their unstable cash flows and higher implied earnings volatility. In this study, the risk of the firm (RISK) is measured by the variability of the last ten year's earnings, and we expect it to have a negative impact on the debt ratio. 4
Tangible assets consist mainly of fixed assets. Asset tangibility represents the firm's asset structure and has a direct impact on its capital structure choice. The value of a firm's tangible assets (TANG) is measured as the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, and is used as a proxy for collateral. In a world of asymmetric information, the firm's tangible fixed assets can often serve as collateral to lower the risk of lenders who undertake the agency cost of debt. Therefore, firms with a greater proportion of fixed assets tend to have a higher debt ratio.
Corporate income tax makes debt financing more advantageous than equity financing because interest expenses are tax deductible, lowering the effective cost of debt. The corporate income tax rate has long been identified as a potential determinant of the capital structure decision. Firms prefer to have more debt than equity because of the tax shield on interest. Miller (1977) finds a positive relationship between the corporate income tax rate and firm leverage. In this study, we use the ratio of tax paid by the firm to EBIT as a proxy for the tax shield benefits of debt (TAX) and expect a positive relationship.
The quick ratio is defined as the ratio of the book value of current assets after subtracting the book value of inventories to current liabilities. It captures the magnitude of assets that the company can transform into cash within a short period of time relative to what it owes in the short term. The more liquid the firm, the less it will rely on debt. Therefore, according to the pecking order theory, there should be a negative relationship between liquidity and internally generated cash flows and leverage. In this study, we use the quick ratio as a proxy for the firm's liquidity position (LIQR) and expect it to have a negative impact on leverage.
Finally, we include 29 industry dummy variables to control for systematic differences in leverage across industries due to differences in systematic risk and unequal possession of fixed assets. Industries are classified into 30 economic groups based on the classification adopted by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. There are several reasons for thinking that the industry in which a firm operates will have a significant effect on its capital structure. Significant differences exist across industries, which influence the capital structure of firms in a certain industry. Some industries may require heavy investment in fixed assets, which is a significant variable in the determination of capital structure because fixed assets are closely related to the firm's collateral value. Some industries may carry a high cost of bankruptcy and financial distress. Heavy industries, such as construction, chemicals, electrical goods, engineering, and textiles, are likely to have higher leverage than other industries. Small industries, such as transportation, cement, and food and beverages, are likely to have low debt ratios. Tax structures and subsidies also vary significantly across industries, suggesting that there will be significant differences in leverage across industries.
Model Specification
The objective is to assess the impact of ownership structure and change in ultimate ownership on financing behavior at various points in time. The model needs to be dynamic to enable us to compare the state of capital structure at the time of change in control and after the change in control. We will also compare transfers to various corporate entities, such as financial institutions, other affiliated corporation, and private individuals.
The most important consideration in developing such a model is to separate the impact of ownership and change in control from other factors that might influence capital structure. This can be achieved through panel estimations and by including the lag of the dependent variable as one of the right-hand side regressors. With this lagged dependent variable, any measured influence on financing behavior is conditioned on the entire history of the right-hand side variables. In the econometric literature and in the context of panel data, such models are usually referred to as dynamic panel data models and are written as follows: Standard panel models, such as fixed-effects and random-effects models, are biased and inconsistent in this case as the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the error term   it . This inconsistency persists even when no autocorrelation in the error term is assumed. The general approach to estimating such a model relies on Arellano and Bond (1991) , who suggest using a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator and instrumental variables technique. GMM uses the data in first-differenced form, which distributes the underlying heterogeneity among the various cross-sectional units. 5 Accordingly, equation (1) can be written as:
By taking the first difference, the lagged differences of the dependent variable on the right-hand side of the equation are no longer correlated with the (2) can be estimated using
. Although Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest using additional lags of the dependent variable as instruments to enable even more efficient estimation, doing so can lead to the over-identification of the model. They show that GMM provides a consistent estimator if the underlying assumption of no second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals is fulfilled. The first-order autocorrelation in residuals from equation (2) does not imply inconsistency in the estimated parameters. Arellano and Bond also suggest applying a specification test to check for over-identification (j-statistics) in the model and a test for second-order autocorrelation.
In estimating the impact of ownership structure, we estimate the following model using GMM:
5 By using GMM, one is better able to control for the effects of missing or unobserved variables. Specifically, including the lag of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable in the estimated equation enables us to capture the effects of omitted variables. These effects are driven by either individual time-invariant variables or period individual-invariant variables. Individual time-invariant variables are the same for given cross-sectional units over time but vary across cross-sectional units (intangible assets, managerial skill). Period individual-invariant variables are the same for all crosssectional units at a given time but vary over time (macroeconomic scenario). All these omitted variables may be correlated with the independent variable. Hence, the GMM technique overcomes possible heterogeneity and omitted variable problems, which often arise with cross-sectional analysis. We also incorporate a year dummy to control for unobserved macroeconomic effects. In the third stage, we estimate a more detailed model comprising information about the entities to which ownership is transferred. As discussed previously, all transfers are categorized as transfers to financial institutions (FIT), to nonfinancial corporations (NFIT), to domestic private individuals and foreigners (PFIT), or to none of the above corporate entities (diverse transfers). The general model to be considered is written as follows:
Similar to the previous model in equation (5) 
Sample
The dataset we use is based on firms' own financial accounts and contains corporate financial data on 1,362 firms that were publicly listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 1 and 2 during the period 1991 to 2009 (19 years). However, financial institutions (financial services comprising commercial banks, insurance companies, securities firms, and mutual funds) are not included in the sample because they have a special capital structure. Their capital structure is strongly influenced by investors' insurance schemes and debt-like liabilities that are not comparable to the debt issued by corporate (nonfinancial) firms. The data used in this analysis has been taken from the Nikkei Economic Electronic Databank System (NEEDS); the data on share prices used to calculate the market value-based measures is taken from the Toyo Keizai share prices database.
The initial sample consisted of financial data on more than 2,400 firms, but 1,099 firms were omitted because of missing data, either due to their recent entry in or delisting from the stock market. Our analysis is based, therefore, on the remaining 1,362 firms for the period 1991 to 2009, spread across 30 industrial categories. The distribution of sampled firms in various industries is based on the classification adopted by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Tables 2 and 3 provide descriptive statistics for both the dependent variable(s) and explanatory variables. The data for certain variables, such as the TQR and leverage, have outliers that could affect the regression results. We use the Winsorized transformation for possible outliers in the dataset, which limits extreme values to reduce the effect of possibly spurious outliers. All the outliers are set to 90 percent Winsorization, which sets data below the fifth percentile to the fifth percentile and data above the 95 th percentile to the 95 th percentile. 
Empirical Results
Examining the effect of ultimate ownership reveals two general observations. On one hand, the signs and statistical significance of the regression coefficients for both measures of capital structure are stable. On the other, there are marked differences in the magnitude of impact of the explanatory variables on leverage. Table 4 shows the impact of ownership structure on leverage. The results support the idea that ownership structure strongly influences firms' leverage. Ownership concentration, represented by the Herfindahl index (HI), has a negative statistically significant effect on both measures of leverage (BLEV and MLEV). However, the magnitude of impact and statistical significance is higher for BLEV than for MLEV, suggesting that shareholders of a firm with more concentrated ownership may prefer less debt if debt brings about more monitoring (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Diamond, 1984) . It also shows that ownership concentration reduces the agency cost between managers and shareholders and facilitates equity.
Ownership Structure and Capital Structure
In terms of ownership structure, BKSH is positively related to the debt-equity ratio. The estimated impact is highly statistically significant for both measures of leverage. The results suggest that firms with a higher percentage share owned by financial institutions are financed heavily by debt because of the affiliated firm's relationship with the main bank. This shows that the main bank system in Japan has enabled corporations to obtain funds efficiently and invest in relatively risky projects. This system propelled the postwar high growth of the Japanese economy.
The ownership share of other affiliated firms, and foreign and domestic private individuals has an inverse relationship with market and book leverage. However, the estimated impact of private individuals' ownership on MLEV is statistically insignificant (but still negative). Although private and foreign individuals collectively hold smaller equity positions than stable investors, the size of their shareholdings and their influence appear to be on the rise. The ownership share of private and foreign individuals is consistently associated with a shift from bank debt to equity financing and the breakdown of banks' monopolistic power in the financial market. With an increase in the ownership share of market investors, the firm's management faces more pressure, which prevents it from building its own empire at the expense of shareholders. The inverse relationship between NBKSH and leverage is consistent with the standard theoretical assumption that cross-shareholding in the Japanese corporate market is generally not intended for short-term gains in income, but is for long-term or stable holding. In such a situation, firms have enough internal funds to finance their operations and are less dependent on bank debt.
Managerial ownership (INSIDE) is negatively associated with BLEV but only marginally significantly. The result is in accordance with Jensen and Meckling's (1976) "convergence of interest" hypothesis, which suggests that managerial ownership serves to align the interests of managers and outside shareholders. Thus, when managerial ownership increases, it limits the risk of wasting free cash flows and managers make fewer decisions that might have a negative effect on the firm's value-the part of costs that they will absorb as shareholders increases with their share of capital. The government ownership ratio has a negative significant impact on both measures of leverage, suggesting that, as state ownership increases, there is more pressure on the firm's management to limit the wasting of free cash flows.
The results indicate a positive relationship between firm size and BLEV and MLEV that is statistically significant at 1 percent. This supports the theory that size is an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. The positive relationship suggests that larger firms are better able to raise debt and are less vulnerable to bankruptcy than smaller firms. The relationship between leverage and profitability is negative and statistically significant at 1 percent in the case of BLEV and at 5 percent for MLEV. This finding favors the pecking order theory rather than the static tradeoff model. The inverse relationship can be explained by the significant differences in the information cost between external and internal finance. When there is significant information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, firms must depend on internal sources before seeking external finance.
The results do not reveal clearly the relationship between leverage and growth opportunities. When measured as MLEV, we find a negative relationship between leverage and growth opportunities that is statistically significant at 1 percent. However, when BLEV is considered the dependent variable, we find a positive but statistically insignificant relationship. The negative relationship is consistent with the signaling theory; this suggests that, when the firm pursues a growth-oriented strategy and future prospects are not favorable, it will avoid debt financing and will sell stock to reduce its future liabilities and bring in new shareholders to share its higher expected future liabilities.
The relationship between risk and leverage is significant at 5 percent and is negative in both cases. 6 The negative sign implies that volatility is a proxy for the risk of a firm. The model indicates a negative relationship between leverage and tangibility that is statistically significant at 1 percent for both BLEV and MLEV. This is due partly to the institutional environment, which, in the case of firm bankruptcy, induces obstacles and lowers asset value. Such an effect might explain the existence of no relationship, but it is not very likely to cause a negative relationship. The theory should provide some additional explanation.
With regard to the debt tax shield variable, we find a positive relationship with leverage (consistent with corporate finance theory) that is statistically significant at 5 percent. The results suggest that the tax advantages of debt are attractive to firms in Japan-a company can reduce its after-tax cost of capital by increasing debt relative to equity, and thereby directly increasing its intrinsic value. The estimated relationship between liquidity and leverage is negative and significant at 1 percent in both cases, which is consistent with the pecking order theory. Liquid firms prefer internal equity and use less debt.
Many empirical studies have controlled for industry classification in their models (see Huang & Song, 2002; Frank & Goyal, 2003; Kim, Heshmati, & Aoun, 2006) , but they do not provide explicit results. We have included dummy variables for 29 industries in our model and classified these industries into 30 economic groups based on the classification adopted by the Tokyo Stock Exchange. It is interesting to note that most of the dummies are statistically significant and their sign does not vary much across different measures of leverage.
The results for size, profitability, risk, tax, and liquidity are similar to those given in most other empirical studies, but ambiguous in the case of growth opportunities and the tangibility ratio. In the case of growth opportunities, the results are based on the definition of leverage. 6 An alternative measure of firm risk, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) beta, is also used in the regression analysis. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant at 5 percent for both measures of leverage. The risk of each firm is calculated using stock market monthly data on returns from 1987 to 2009. Using the past five years' monthly returns (60 observations), we estimate the CAPM developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) to compute the CAPM beta.
Changes in Ultimate Ownership and Capital Structure
Table 5 helps to assess the impact of change in ultimate control, based on the results for equation (4). The estimated impacts of governance structure, ownership concentration, and other control variables are similar to the results in Table 4 in terms of statistical significance and sign, but there are minor variations in magnitude. The results for the change in ownership confirm our earlier predictions. The estimated coefficient for the year of change and the first year after the change in control is negative and statistically significant. However, in the case of BLEV, the coefficient is positive and statistically insignificant even at 10 percent for the second year after the change in ultimate ownership. With regard to MLEV, leverage falls at all three points in time but the fall is higher in the first year after the change than in the other two periods. Overall, the results in Table 5 suggest that leverage measured either in terms of book value or market value falls in the year of change in control and in the subsequent period. Thus, change in ownership is followed by an alteration in the firm's capital structure.
Transfer of Control to Various Corporate Entities and Capital Structure
We now compare transfers to various corporate entities by estimating equation (5), employing the GMM two-step estimation method. This model takes into account information regarding the transaction parties involved, and includes all the control and governance structure variables, along with the ownership transfer dummies FIT, NFIT, and PFIT. To conserve space, Table 6 reports only the results for the impact of ownership transfer observed in three distinct periods. The estimated impacts of governance structure, ownership concentration, and other control variables are similar to the results in Table 4 in terms of statistical significance, sign, and magnitude. There is, however, a marked difference in the impact of change in ownership on capital structure measures among FIT, NFIT, and PFIT.
Overall, the results in Table 6 support the results obtained in the first stage by estimating equation (3). The impact of change in ultimate ownership is negative for transfers to private individuals and nonfinancial institutions and positive for transfers to financial institutions. Leverage falls in the year of change of control, but it increases in the subsequent two periods. The effect is much stronger in the case of MLEV. This is consistent with the premise of the main bank relationship with the affiliated firm.
We also find an inverse relationship between NFIT and PFIT and capital structure. For nonfinancial institutions, BLEV falls in the year of change and in the first year after the transfer of control; in the case of MLEV, capital structure is unaffected in the year of transfer but leverage falls in the subsequent two periods. Similarly, for transfers to private individuals, both BLEV and MLEV remain statistically the same as the pre-transfer level in the year of change, and there is a significant decrease in the debt ratio in the first and second years after the transfer. Tables 4, 5, and 6 also report the p-value of specification tests applied to the dynamic panel data model. In all three cases, the Sargan test (J-statistic) results do not reject the null hypothesis that the over-identified restrictions are valid. Similarly, in most cases, the null hypothesis of no second-order autocorrelation is not rejected. The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test results for the exogeneity of regressors imply that the underlying models do not suffer from an endogeneity problem (for a detailed discussion, see Cameron & Trivedi, 2009 ). The DWH test is carried out to check if GOV causes an endogeneity bias. In sum, the specification tests support the overall validity of these models.
Robustness of Results
An additional potential concern associated with the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is the weak instruments problem of instrumental variable estimators (see Wooldridge, 2002 , for an illustration). Large finite sample biases can occur when the instrumental variables are weak, and this difficulty carries over into the GMM estimation of dynamic panel data models. 7 When the time series are persistent and the number of time-series observations is small, the first-differenced GMM estimator behaves poorly because, under these conditions, the lagged levels of the variables are only weak instruments for subsequent first-differences (see Bond & Windmeijer, 2001) . Since the previously applied Sargan test does not reject the null hypothesis that the over-identification restrictions are valid, this problem is unlikely to affect our results.
The takeover decision also depends on the firm's leverage (Novaes & Zingales, 1995) , and therefore we cannot completely rule out the possibility of endogeneity in the models. However, there is a broad consensus in the literature on panel data models that GMM accounts for endogeneity in such models.
Nonetheless, to explicitly address these two issues, we present a fixed-effects formulation of equations (3), (4), and (5) along with the following equation, which describes the impact of leverage on ownership structure. These are then estimated using the fixed-effects two-stage leastsquares method (FE-2SLS).

LEV is the leverage of the firm, measured as BLEV or MLEV. GOV is the ownership structure and includes BKSH, NBKSH, FRGN, PRVT, INSIDE, and GOVT. SIZE and time dummies are included to account for the effect of economies of scale and time, respectively. ROA and TQR are included because of the consensus that the firm's ownership structure depends on the performance and investment opportunities available to it. 8
Although a fixed-effects model that includes a lagged dependent variable as the regressor can lead to biased estimates, this approach still serves as a benchmark. The estimators are consistent as N or T approach infinity and can be used to verify the robustness of the GMM results.
In the first stage, we apply the Hausman (1978) specification test to evaluate the relationship between the individual-specific effect   i and other explanatory variables. The test is used whether a fixed effects or random effects formulation is more appropriate for estimating these parameters. The chi-squared values computed are tabulated in Table 7 .
The test results imply that the individual-specific effects are correlated with the right-hand side variables. The random-effects estimates appear to be significantly biased with a high probability. Therefore, the fixed-effects model seems more appropriate for estimating the model specified in (3), (4), (5), and (6). In the second stage, we estimate the fixed-effects specification of equation (6) and use the fitted GOV (denoted as  GOV ) as an instrument for GOV in the system of equations specified in (3), (4), and (5). Subsequently, the fixed-effects models are estimated using equations (3), (4), and (5) for both measures of leverage. The results for the impact of ownership structure and other control variables are presented in Table 8 . Examining the effect of ultimate ownership reveals that the signs and statistical significance of the regression coefficients are similar to those given in Table 4 . Table 9 gives the results for the impact of change in ultimate ownership regardless of the identity of the transaction parties involved, based on an FE-2SLS specification. For further insight into the impact of ownership change, in the third stage we estimate a more detailed model that includes information on the entities to which ownership is transferred. The results are presented in Table 10 . The estimated equation includes all the control and governance structure variables and period dummy variables (not reported) along with the ownership transfer dummies FIT, NFIT, and PFIT. The table reports only the results for the impact of ownership transfer observed in three distinct time periods. In summary, the estimates yielded by the two-stage method are unchanged in terms of statistical significance, but there are minor deviations in the magnitude of impact. However, these are negligible and may have arisen because the industry-specific dummy variables were dropped. Therefore, the GMM estimation results can be used as benchmarks to evaluate the impact of ownership change on firm financing behavior. The fixed-effects specification results show that the GMM estimates are consistent and robust.
Concluding Remarks
Our study has shown that using GMM rather than other panel estimation methods has clear advantages in a model characterized by heteroskedasticity and endogeneity. Although the GMM estimator is more efficient than other estimators, it would not be asymptotically worse in the absence of heteroskedasticity. Nevertheless, the use of GMM comes at a price. The problem, as Hayashi (2001) points out, is that the optimal weighting matrix at the core of efficient GMM is a function of fourth moments, obtaining reasonable estimates of which would require very large samples. The consequence is that the efficient GMM estimator may have poor small-sample properties. In particular, Wald tests tend to overreject the null hypothesis.
Since the results presented above are not completely free from the problems that generally arise in panel data estimation (even if using a more standard econometric model, estimation technique, and robustness tests), we cannot argue that the method avoids all problems. Thus, further tests are necessary to estimate more accurate results, but these results have several important implications.
First, firms with more concentrated ownership may prefer less debt as ownership concentration reduces the extent of agency costs between managers and shareholders and facilitates equity. Firms that lack the disciplinary role of ultimate owners are more inclined toward debt financing.
Second, firms with a higher percentage share owned by financial institutions are financed heavily by debt because of the affiliated firm's relationship with the main bank. The main bank system enables corporations to obtain funding efficiently and invest in relatively risky projects. The positive relationship between transfers to financial institutions and leverage suggests that unwinding the cross-shareholding between banks and corporations yields efficiency gains. While banks still hold significant equity positions and have large influence over corporations, both their shareholding and influence are declining with the changing relationship between financial institutions and their client firms in Japan.
Third, although private and foreign individuals still collectively hold smaller equity positions than stable investors, the size of their shareholdings and their influence appear to be on the rise. The ownership share of private and foreign individuals is consistently associated with a shift from bank debt to equity financing and the breakdown of banks' monopolistic power in the financial market. Ownership transfer to other affiliated corporations, and to private and foreign individuals is invariably associated with high efficiency in expenditure and raising funds through equity financing. Mutual transfers among nonfinancial institutions do not have a significant positive impact on leverage.
Fourth, managerial ownership serves to align the interests of managers and outside shareholders. Thus, when managerial ownership increases, the risk of wasting free cash flows is limited and managers make fewer decisions that might have a negative effect on the firm's value. Government ownership is also associated with more pressure on the management to limit the wasting of free cash flows.
Finally, the relative power of stable and market investors to influence corporate behavior is undergoing an important change. The results provide clear evidence that changes in control are followed by improvements in the efficiency of fund raising. Changes in ultimate ownership also lead to major asset and capital restructuring in subsequent years.
Annex The Reforms Process in Japan
Between the 1950s and 1980s, rapid economic growth contributed to high returns on financial assets-especially on stocks-in Japan. The market bubble burst at the end of the 1980s, however, changed investment behavior along with the structure of the market, and led to the "lost" decade of the 1990s. During this period, all asset classes (except bonds) performed dismally as the interest rate fell to its minimum level and returns on stocks remained negative. The overall economy and the financial market in particular stumbled because of the slow pace of structural change and the substantial impact of massive bad loans. Japan's "lost" decade is considered similar to the Great Depression that followed the 1929 stock market crash in the US. At the end of 1929, the Dow Jones industrial average stood at 164.58 and only after 16 years did the index reach 192.91. The performance of Japan's stock market after the market bubble burst mirrors the performance of the US market in the wake of the 1929 crash.
In order to restore economic growth and move toward a more efficient and competitive market-based system, the Japanese government introduced ambitious and wide-ranging reforms in the 1990s to remove inefficiencies and market distortions. These restructuring reforms were directed at strengthening the capital market. Measures included, among others, deregulating the banking sector, refining the interbank funding markets, opening up domestic financial markets to foreign investors, allowing domestic investors to participate in financial markets overseas, corporate governance, improving asset quality, consumer financing, legal reforms, prudential regulations, credit rating, and introducing a new mechanism to allow greater exchange rate flexibility. The financial sector was restructured and opened up to competition.
Prior to the adoption of the open-door policy in 1990, the financial system in Japan was characterized by a restricted flow of capital due to various regulations such as foreign exchange and foreign trade control laws, the foreign investment law, and the allocation of capital based on government policy rather than competitive market forces. A wide range of corporate governance reforms were carried out incrementally and numerous amendments made to the commercial codes and other related laws.
These reforms paved the way for drastic changes and restructuring activities in the corporate sector. This led to an increase in the number of firms listed on the stock exchange: the average rose to 99 new firms per year during 1997-2004 compared to 36 per year during 1990-96 and only 26 per year between 1981 and 1989. Similarly, 41 firms were delisted per year from the stock exchange during 1997-2004 compared to just four or five firms per year during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Firms rapidly sought to restructure their organization, behavior, and financial choices. Decentralization in business decisions was introduced and financial choices that had been dominated by indirect borrowing shifted from the debt market to the capital market. These changes were closely associated with changes in corporate boards, such as the introduction of an executive officers system and greater separation of monitoring and management functions. Merger and acquisition transactions increased from 252 per year in 1991-97 to 1,381 annually in 1998-2005.
The corporate governance structure also changed drastically. The main bank system was institutionally displaced and its scope became more limited. Cross-shareholding-one of the main features of corporate governance structures in the pre-bubble burst period-decreased significantly and the scope and role of private individuals and foreign institutional investors rapidly increased.
